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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED DORMANT MINERAL 
LEGISLATION FOR ARKANSAS
The burdensome and often futile efforts to locate mineral 
owners for leasing purposes is a consequence of recognizing, as 
the Arkansas Supreme Court did in the landmark case of Bodcaw 
Lumber Co. v. Goode1 that oil and gas may be severed from the 
surface estate, and what results is a perpetual mineral estate 
that is not lost by abandonment or non-use or acquired by adverse 
possession of the surface.2 Since that development mineral 
ownership separate and apart from the surface ownership has 
become commonplace. Indeed, conveyancing in areas where mineral 
exploration and production prevails has been characterized by 
grants or reservations of "oil, gas and other minerals" or "the 
surface only." Further, conveyances of fractional mineral 
interests during boom times to investors and speculators and 
devolution of title by testate and intestate succession has 
resulted in highly fractionalized ownership of many mineral 
titles.
Passage of time and failure of severed mineral owners to 
probate non-productive mineral properties often results in dif-
ficulty in ascertaining mineral ownership and locating the 
mineral owners.3 If the mineral owner is "lost", cannot be found 
or is "unknown", the ownership cannot be ascertained and the
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acquisition of leases is impossible. Further, lack of an opera- 
tative system of ad valoreum taxation for severed mineral 
interests precludes forclosures for non-payment of taxes from 
solving many "lost” or "unknown” mineral owner problems.4
Although remedies exist for the "lost” or "unknown” mineral 
owner,5 especially 52 Ark. Stat. Ann. 2016 et seq., commonly 
referred to as the receivership statute, dormant mineral legislation 
is currently pending in the Arkansas legislature. Since dormant 
mineral acts have been introduced in the legislature in 19557 and 
1973,8 such legislation is not a stranger to the General Assembly.9 
The impetus for the current legislation is the recent United 
States Supreme Court decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short,10 which 
sustained the constitutionality of the Indiana dormant mineral 
act.
This is the background of the problem. The remainder of my 
remarks will focus on the existing remedies now available for the 
"lost" or "unknown" mineral owner phenomena with emphasis, due to 
its importance, on the receivership statute. Then, the dormant 
mineral acts pending in the legislature will be reviewed.
Limitations on the existing remedies will be highlighted so that 
the need, if any, of a dormant mineral act can be better 
assessed. Professor Webber, my colleague from the UALR School of 
Law, will discuss Texaco, Inc. v. Short and the constitutional 
objections to dormant mineral legislation, if any, that remain 
after that decision.
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The Receivership Act
52 Ark. Stat. Ann. 201 et seq., permits a tenant in common, 
or its lessee, to mineral lands or severed mineral interests to 
compel appointment of a receiver in the Chancery Court who is 
empowered to execute a lease to the mineral lands or interests.
The lease must be executed for cash and a royalty and be "to the 
best interests of, or compensation to,” the affected mineral 
owners.11 If the consideration is "fair and equitable” the court 
must approve the lease.12 The statute may not be utilized, 
however when operations under a valid mining lease are being 
undertaken on the tract.13
The statute is broad in its scope. It is applicable not 
only to the "lost" or "unknown" mineral owner but also to the 
known mineral owner who refuses to execute the lease, i.e., the 
recalcitrant mineral owner. However, as the statute may only be 
invoked by a tenant in common, or its lessee, to the outstanding 
mineral interest, it offers no solution to the "lost" or "unknown" 
mineral owner problem when the interest of a cotenant is neither 
owned or under lease. For example, a tract to which none of the 
mineral owners can be found cannot be leased under the statute.
The statute was before the Arkansas Supreme Court in Davis 
v. Schimmel.14 Even though the case did not involve a direct 
constitutional assault on the act, the statute was applied 
therein and the bar has viewed the case as alleviating all doubts 
as to the constitutionality of the statute.
Receivership Pursuant to Partition and Sale 
A similar statutory scheme, 53 Ark. Stat. Ann. 401,15 et seq. 
provides for appointment of a receiver to execute an oil and gas 
lease on the entire tract, not merely the interest of the defen-
dant mineral owner, pursuant to a partition action.16 The court 
must find that the interests of the parties will be fully pro-
tected, and the various interests will have greater value after 
the execution of an oil and gas lease than after a sale or par-
tition in kind of the interests. The lease must provide for a 
royalty of not less than (1/8) one-eighth and, also, be upon such 
terms as are "just and proper.” The statute may only be applied 
when no production or oil and gas lease covering the entire 
leasehold estate is outstanding.
As with 52 Ark. Stat. Ann. 201 et. seq., the statute appears 
to be applicable to the recalictrant mineral owner as well as 
the "lost" or "unknown" mineral owner. Also, a cotenancy rela-
tionship must exist before the statute may be utilized. The 
constitutionality of the act was upheld over due process objec-
tions in Overton v. Porterfield.17
Since in most instances oil and gas leases will have been 
acquired on some of the mineral interests to the tract involved, 
with the necessity for the receivership extending only to the 
unleased interests, 52 Ark. Stat. Ann. 201 et seq. is probably 
the most prevalently used statute as it. only requires a sale of 
the unleased interest while 52 Ark. Stat. Ann. 401 et. seq. 
requires a lease to the entire mineral estate.
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Finally, both receivership statutes have been criticized.18 
As each statute entails judicial proceedings, they offer an 
expensive remedy.19 The most salient criticism, however, arises 
from the conflict of interest that exists when, as usually hap-
pens, the receiver executing the lease on behalf of the defendant 
mineral owners is acting solely to accommodate the plaintiff- 
lessee .20
Forced Integration
The forced integration statute, 53 Ark. Stat. Ann. 115,21 et.
seq., also provides a remedy for the "lost” or "unknown” mineral 
owner. The act is applicable to "separately owned tracts and 
separately owned interests” in all or part of the spacing unit.22 
Thus, "non-consenting acreage” within the spacing unit as well as 
"non-consenting" undivided mineral interest to tracts located 
within the spacing unit are governed by the statute. There is 
only one potential limitation on forced integration as a remedy 
for the "lost" mineral owner. The statutory remedy may be appli-
cable only when the tract in issue is encompassed within an 
established drilling unit, which requires the existence of a com-
mon "pool,"23 and precludes its use for a wildcat prospect. If 
the statute could be construed as permitting the establishment of 
drilling units for a potential, as opposed to an actual, common 
source of supply, forced integration would not be so limited.24
If the forced integration statute is applicable, the lost or 
unknown mineral owner would appear to be relegated to the forced 
sale option, a cash sum for the development right which is 
equivalent to a bonus plus a royalty interest.25 The Oil and Gas
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Commission typically requires the unleased mineral owner to 
affirmitatively elect to take its proportionate share of produc-
tion, either by having its proportionate share of costs recovered 
out of production plus a risk factor penalty or by paying its 
advance share of costs.26 The proceeds from the forced sale and 
royalty would probably be placed in an escrow account.
Senate Bill No. 30
Senate Bill No. 3027 provides that a mineral interest unused 
for twenty (20) years is extinguished and reverts to the surface 
owner unless a statement of claim is filed of record by the 
mineral owner.28 The definition of a mineral interest appears to 
include, by implication, a royalty or leasehold interest as well 
as a mineral interest in coal, oil and gas and other minerals.29 
Use which precludes extinquishment is defined as production, 
receipt of delay rentals, minimum or shut-in royalty, or gas or 
other liquid storage operations on the land or the land pooled or 
unitized therewith.30 Payment of taxes on the mineral interest is 
also a use precluding extinquishment.31 Further, fulfilling any of 
the use criteria preserves all of the interests conveyed or 
reserved in the instrument of severance.32 Thus, production of oil 
preserves the gas or any other mineral encompassed within a grant 
of "oil, gas and other minerals.”
The claim of ownership, equivalent to use under the act, 
must contain the name and address of the owner, legal description 
of the land, book and page of the recorded instrument of 
severance and be recorded in the circuit clerk's office.33 As the 
act operates retroactively, the filing must be made within one
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(1) year from the enactment of the act if the twenty (20) year 
period of nonuse has run.34 If the twenty years of nonuse has not 
yet passed, the claim must be filed before the period expires.35 
An unobservant owner of extensive mineral interests may be 
spared from having an unused mineral interest extinquished for 
failure to timely file a statement of claim.36 To qualify for the 
exception the omission must have been due to inadvertance.37 Also, 
on the expiration date for the filing of the ownership claim, at 
least ten (10) other mineral interests must have been owned in 
the county where the non-preserved mineral interest is situated.38 
Further, the mineral owner must have made a diligent effort to 
preserve all unused mineral interests and some interests must 
have actually been preserved by proper filing of ownership claims 
within ten (10) years of the expiration date for the filing of 
the non-preserved interest.39 Finally, within sixty (60) days of 
acquiring knowledge of the lapsed interest or the giving of 
notice by publication by the successor-in-interest to the lapsed 
interest, the mineral owner must file a statement of claim.40
Dormant mineral legislation, if enacted, should operate so 
that mineral ownership can be determined with certainty, pre-
ferably from record title, without necessity of litigation.
Further, the act should readily permit a determination that the 
standard for a drilling title examination, a defensible title,
i.e., a title that can be successfully defended, exists.
Basically, the present proposal fails to meet these requirements.
First, needless litigation will be required due to the 
failure of the statute to sufficiently define the terms and scope
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of its operation. The most glaring deficiency is the failure of 
the act to specifically define "production,” which precludes 
extinquishment under the act, in terms of "paying quantities" or 
whatever standard is intended to apply. Further, if intended to 
encompass dormant royalty interests, the statute should expli-
citly so indicate.
More importantly, the existence of "defensible title" may 
not be readily ascertained as to mineral interests that have 
apparently reverted to the surface owner under the act for, inter 
alia, failure to file an ownership claim. In effect, the possi-
bility of a subsequent proper filing under the exception provi-
sion must be eliminated before a defensible title in the surface 
owner can be established. Thus, the relevant records must be 
checked to ascertain if ten (10) other mineral interests, some of 
which were preserved by a proper filing, were owned by the 
severed mineral owner in the county on the expiration date. 
Ascertaining such information may well be burdensome and time 
consuming.
Additionally, other information, outside of the record title 
and difficult to acquire, may often be required by the act to 
resolve mineral ownership. For example, historical production 
records for the land and for any lands with which the tract was 
pooled may be required to determine if non-production existed 
during the requisite period for extinquishment. Also, if an oil 
and gas lease providing for delay rental payments was executed 
during the twenty (20) year period of non-production, evidence 
that delay rentals were actually paid must be produced before it
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can be determined whether the mineral interest has been 
extinquished. The act could have avoided a possible difficult 
issue of fact, which will likely make location of the burden of 
proof determinative of the issue, by providing a statutory pre-
sumption that such payments have been made.
Summary
Turning from the shortcomings of the proposed act, the need 
for dormant mineral legislation in Arkansas is difficult to 
assess. Admittedly, the receivership and forced integration sta-
tutes, the traditional remedies, may not offer a comprehensive 
solution to the problem. If a producing formation is a prere-
quisite for establishing drilling units, development rights to 
wildcat lands may not be acquired by forced integration. Also, 
the receivership acts may only be used when the applicant is a 
cotenant with the absent mineral owner. Thus, the traditional 
remedies offer no solution for lands that are not embraced within 
established field wide units and have not been leased, or a 
mineral interest acquired therein, due to lost mineral ownership.
However, despite the deficiencies inherent in the tradi-
tional statutory remedies, no empirical evidence exists, to my 
knowledge, which indicates that exploration or production on 
Arkansas lands has been prevented by the lost mineral owner phe-
nomenon. The lack of empirical evidence may be attributed either 
to the fact that any such revelation would disclose proprietary 
information or that the lack of a universal remedy has only had 
academic significance.
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However, dormant mineral legislation need not be justified 
solely on the basis of necessity for development. Addresses, 
initially current, of owners of non-productive severed mineral 
interests will be yielded by the registration requirement, a com-
mon feature of such legislation. Mineral interests not preserved 
by compliance with the act will be extinquished. Thus, leasing 
of mineral interests will be expedited and the costly, protracted 
and often fruitless search for missing mineral owners should 
occur only rarely.
Ideally, the decision to adopt dormant mineral legislation 
should involve a balancing of the public’s interest in 
facilitating the leasing of mineral interests against the 
interests of non-productive severed mineral owners who may lose 
their mineral rights for failure to comply with a statute of 
which they may have no knowledge. Non-resident mineral owners, 
who are unlikely to receive information on the adoption of an 
Arkansas statute, are particularly vulnerable under such legisla- 
tion. Texaco, Inc. v. Short only resolved that the dormant 
mineral acts under scrutiny therein satisfied the due process 
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Even if the proposed 
legislation is constitutional, a question remains concerning its 
propriety.
The result from the balancing of the interests, i.e., 
whether or not dormant mineral legislation should be adopted, 
does not appear self-evident. However, surface owners, who have 
traditionally borne the burden of oil and gas operations without
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sharing in the benefits of production, will have no such hesi-
tancy in supporting the legislation. Dormant mineral acts, such 
as Senate Bill No. 30, provide a windfall for the surface owner, 
i.e., title to the extinquished mineral interest. Given the 
militancy of modern surface owners, as manifested by liberal 
"surface damage"41 and "surface owner royalty"42 statutes adopted 
or proposed in other states, dormant mineral legislation will, if 
not adopted at this session, remain a perennial subject for the 
legislature. If a dormant mineral legislation is ever to become 
a reality in Arkansas, the act must be well-drafted, clear and 
concise and provide certainty as to mineral ownership without 
imposing new and additional title problems.
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